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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-1078 
_____________ 
 
OTOS TECH CO., LTD. 
v. 
OGK AMERICA, INC.; YALE KIM, a/k/a Youngil Kim 
v. 
OTOS OPTICAL CO., LTD; MOON YOUNG HUH 
 
        Otos Tech Co., Ltd.; Otos Optical Co., Ltd.; Moon 
Young Huh,  
                   
               Appellants 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(Civ. No. 2:03-01979) 
District Judge:  Hon. William H. Walls 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 24, 2011 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, JORDAN, and GREENAWAY, JR., 
Circuit Judges. 
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(Filed: August 9, 2011) 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 Otos Tech. Co., Ltd., Otos Optical Co., Ltd., and 
Moon Young Huh (collectively, “Otos”) appeal the District 
Court’s denial of their request to enforce a judgment of the 
Supreme Court of South Korea against OGK America, Inc. 
and Yale Kim (collectively, “Kim”).  For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm.   
 
I. 
 
This appeal involves two parallel litigations:  one in 
the United States, before the United States District Court for 
the District of New Jersey, and one in South Korea.  Otos 
originally brought suit in the District of New Jersey in 2003, 
asserting claims for breach of contract, conversion, and 
embezzlement.  These claims arose out of Kim’s retention of 
three checks worth $587,775.05.  Kim answered and asserted 
counterclaims for breach of contract, breach of a settlement 
agreement, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.  Kim maintained that Otos wrongfully terminated his 
employment contract and that he retained the three checks 
pursuant to an agreement between the two parties to settle this 
wrongful termination.   
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While this lawsuit was still pending, Otos brought an 
action against Kim in South Korea and asserted essentially 
identical claims pertaining to the same three checks.  On 
December 16, 2005, a South Korean court entered judgment 
in favor of Otos in the amount of 607,156,665 South Korean 
Won, which was later reduced on appeal to 544,920,318 
South Korean Won, an amount that was equivalent to 
$587,755.05 (in U.S. dollars) at the time.  Otos was also 
awarded post-judgment interest on that amount.  Kim 
appealed the decision but the Supreme Court of Korea 
affirmed on December 24, 2008.   
 
Meanwhile, the litigation between Otos and Kim in the 
District of New Jersey proceeded to a trial before a jury.  On 
August 11, 2006, after the conclusion of the trial, judgment 
was entered in favor of Otos in the amount of $587,755.05 on 
Otos’s conversion claim and in favor of Kim in the amount of 
$910,000 on Kim’s counterclaim for breach of the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing.  The District Court denied 
Otos’s motion for a new trial, and both parties appealed.  This 
Court affirmed and remanded to the District Court for the 
calculation of post-judgment interest.  Otos Tech Co. v. OGK 
Am., Inc., 295 F. App’x 514 (3d Cir. 2008).   
 
After the conclusion of the trial, Otos embarked on a 
campaign to seize Kim’s assets in Korea in order to satisfy 
the Korean judgment.  Based on the record before this Court, 
Otos appears to have been successful in this endeavor.  Kim 
ultimately paid 807,619,134 in South Korean Won between 
November 2006 and February 2009 to satisfy the Korean 
judgment, an amount that includes forced sales of Kim’s 
apartment and stocks as well as voluntary deposits made by 
Kim.  In an order dated February 16, 2009, the South Korean 
 4 
 
court rejected Otos’s latest application to seize Kim’s assets, 
stating that “[i]t is clear that . . . the payment of the principal 
and interest on late payment . . . was fully carried out.”  Joint 
Appendix (“JA”) 178 (emphasis added).  Otos does not 
challenge this conclusion on appeal.   
 
Back in the United States, Kim filed a motion on 
December 22, 2008 requesting that the District Court order 
the turnover of funds from the accounts of one of Otos’s 
customers in light of Otos’s failure to pay Kim any money in 
satisfaction of the $910,000 judgment (plus interest) entered 
in Kim’s favor on August 11, 2006.   Otos objected, and also 
argued that any turnover should be subject to a “setoff” in the 
amount of its American judgment, $587,755.05.  The District 
Court granted Kim’s motion on July 29, 2009 and denied 
Otos’s request for a setoff, holding that “[i]f that judgment is 
set-off against [Kim’s] judgment here, a double recovery for 
[Otos] may result since [Otos] could also recover the Korean 
judgment entirely.”  JA 96.   
 
Otos appealed, and we affirmed.  Otos Tech Co. v. 
OGK Am., Inc., 393 F. App’x 5 (3d Cir. 2010).  We held 
“that the District Court was within its discretion to deny Otos 
a setoff based on the possibility of a double recovery” given 
that “it has not been established on the record when, where, to 
whom, or in what amount the payments on the Korean 
judgment have been made.”  Id. at 10 & n.6.  In other words, 
it was unclear at the time whether granting Otos a setoff on its 
American judgment may result in Otos impermissibly 
recovering twice for the same harm:  once in satisfaction of 
its Korean judgment, and again by reducing Kim’s American 
judgment.  In light of the vagaries of the record, we 
concluded by noting that, on remand, the District Court may 
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“test[] the merits of the parties’ claims in order to avoid a 
double recovery” by various means, depending on whether 
Otos filed a motion to enforce the Korean judgment, Kim 
filed a motion to declare Otos’s American judgment satisfied, 
“or by some other means.”  Id. at 10 n.6. 
 
Otos elected to proceed by seeking to enforce the 
Korean judgment.  On September 16, 2010, Otos filed a 
motion before the District Court seeking to satisfy the Korean 
judgment and to “equalize” the Korean judgment with the 
American judgment.  Although Otos did not dispute that Kim 
had satisfied the Korean judgment, Otos asserted that due to a 
devaluation of the South Korean Won, Kim’s satisfaction of 
the Korean judgment only amounted to an actual payment of 
$382,215 (in U.S. dollars).  As a result, Otos maintained that 
the Korean judgment should be “equalized” with the 
American judgment in the amount of $205,540.05, the 
difference between the amount of the American judgment 
($587,755.05) and the actual payments made by Kim after 
being adjusted by currency devaluation ($382,215).   
 
On December 16, 2010, the District Court denied 
Otos’s motion, concluding that although the Korean judgment 
was both valid and enforceable in American courts, it “has 
been fully satisfied.”  JA 26.  This timely appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 
This is a diversity action governed by New Jersey law.  
The District Court had jurisdiction over this action pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) and we have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.   
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We exercise de novo review over a district court’s 
decision to grant full faith and credit to a foreign judgment.  
See Barrows v. Barrows, 489 F.2d 661, 662-63 (3d Cir. 1974) 
(conducting a de novo review in determining the 
enforceability of a foreign judgment); see also Diorinou v. 
Mezitis, 237 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2001) (collecting cases 
and noting that “domestic courts have not clearly articulated 
the standard of appellate review of the decision whether to 
enforce [a] foreign judgment, but appear to be applying a de 
novo standard”).   
 
III. 
 
 As an initial matter, we agree with the District Court’s 
conclusion that the Korean judgment is both valid and 
enforceable in American courts.  “The Treaty of Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation Between the United States of 
America and The Republic of Korea elevates a Korean 
judgment to the status of a sister state judgment,” and “[i]n 
New Jersey, sister state judgments by confession are entitled 
to full faith and credit.”  Choi v. Kim, 50 F.3d 244, 248 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).  None of the various exceptions 
to the enforcement of such sister state judgments – such as 
lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction, or the failure to 
provide adequate due process – are applicable to this case.  
See id. 
 
 Notwithstanding this initial conclusion, we will affirm 
the District Court’s denial of Otos’s motion to enforce the 
Korean judgment.  Put simply, Otos is attempting to enforce 
the wrong judgment in this case.  In our previous opinion in 
this matter, we noted that the record was then unclear whether 
Kim had satisfied the Korean judgment, and that accordingly, 
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a setoff was inappropriate in light of the risk that Otos may 
impermissibly recover twice for the same harm:  once in 
Korea, and then again by reducing Kim’s award by the value 
of Otos’s American judgment.  Otos Tech, 393 F. App’x at 10 
& n.6.   
 
The record now appears to be clear that Kim has 
satisfied the Korean judgment.  A Korean court has explicitly 
held as much and Otos has not contested this fact below or on 
appeal.  As such, there is no merit in Otos’s attempt to satisfy 
the Korean judgment for a second time in the District of New 
Jersey.  There is also no support for Otos’s novel proposition 
that a previously satisfied foreign judgment is subject to some 
kind of “equalization” in American courts in light of currency 
devaluation.  We therefore agree with the District Court’s 
conclusion that the judgment in this case “has been fully 
satisfied.”  JA 26. 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.     
 
